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A DETAILED examination of the variations in the text of Matthew 5 and 19 in the various manuscripts, versions, and quotations in the early Christian writers would be tedious and not very helpful. That there are variations is evident from the margin of the R.V. From that we learn that in Matt. 19:9 "except it be for fornication" is in "some ancient authorities" substituted by "saving for the cause of fornication maketh her an adulteress: as in 5:22"; while the last statement in verse 9 "and that marrieth, etc." is omitted by "some ancient authorities". But while these variations are thus noticed the authorities were not considered of sufficient weight to warrant changes being made in the text. There are other variations as well which, however, are not of great moment. It might reasonably be concluded that such changes as exist indicate that a difficulty has been felt in connexion with the subject from the earliest days.

Considerable freedom is exercised by many writers today in deciding the real teaching of Jesus. Thus Plummer, after saying that the stricter Rabbis taught that the unseemly thing which justified divorce (Deuteronomy 24:1) was adultery, adds "and according to Matthew, Christ said the same thing. Nothing short of adultery justified divorce, but

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adultery did justify it. It is very improbable that Christ did teach this. If we want his true teaching we must go to Mark and Luke, according to whom he declared the indissolubility of the marriage bond." (Commentary on Matthew)

The phrase "it is very improbable" is typical of the way a clause to which objection is felt is disposed of. We only know, however, what Christ taught by what has been recorded; if there are good reasons for thinking from textual evidence that a verse or phrase has been omitted or inserted by copyists it is legitimate to alter the text; but subjective "probabilities" lead to all kinds of confused results. Plummer himself, for example, says that "it is a 'violent hypothesis' to assume (in the face of all external evidence) that 'except on account of fornication' is a later interpolation by early scribes -- (as is done by Wright, Synopsis of the Gospels in Greek, page 90)". Observe the appeal to "all external evidence" to rebut the assumption of Wright: but then Plummer himself adds: "If the interpolation had not already been made in the Jewish-Christian authority which Matthew used, then we must attribute the interpolation to the Evangelist himself." On which two comments only need be made here: (1) by "Matthew" Plummer means not the tax-gather apostle but "the unknown constructor of the first gospel", and (2) an appeal to sources, which do not exist but which are assumed to lie behind the gospels as we have them, is neither capable of proof nor disproof.

While the majority of writers, one copying another, ascribe priority, and therefore greater accuracy, to Mark, there are some who regard Matthew as more dependable, R. H. Charles (Divorce and Nullity) roundly charges the author of Mark with

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mutilation of his sources and with presenting the question, "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife?" in a form "unhistorical and false", "utterly unhistorical" and a "misrepresentation". To Charles, Matthew's account is true and Mark's record altogether undependable.

We have mentioned these differences with regard to the value attached to Mark or Matthew for two reasons. Firstly we wish to illustrate and emphasize a point made in the last chapter on the methods of modern scholars in dealing with texts. We know that brethren have been misled by accepting a statement that a verse was an interpolation, unaware that the reasons for the statement were not based on evidence, but upon the subjective ideas of the writer. If the R.V. does not reject a text it can safely be said that it is reasonably well founded. But second, it is evident from the fact that there is such a difference of opinion that there is difficulty somewhere. If the records of Matthew and Mark were patently in harmony there would be no occasion for the extended discussion through the centuries. The fact that there is so real a difficulty should make us cautious about dogmatizing, while doing all possible to understand the various passages of Scripture.

It is hardly necessary to add that the critical method of disposing of the difficulties either one way or the other by postulating interpolation or editing, is not acceptable to us. If passages are genuine we must seek a way to harmonize apparent differences; but we must also recognize that harmonization may be achieved by a solution satisfactory to some, but which does not commend itself to all.

Leaving for the present the references in Matthew 5, but recognizing the oneness of teaching in that passage and

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Matthew 19, we compare Matthew 19 and Mark 10; it is the variations between these that may be the cause of such different views. That the same incident is recorded in both Matthew and Luke is evident from the context. Both mention the journey from Galilee to the borders of Judaea beyond Jordan and the flocking of crowds to Jesus. The discussion of divorce in both gospels is followed by the blessing of the children and then by the rich young ruler's question how he might get eternal life.

In both gospels the Pharisees are the questioners, both adding that they were "tempting" Jesus. From this point variations begin which may be readily observed by putting the two records in parallel columns:

It might be possible to explain as due to repetition in discussion the differences in the order of the references to Deuteronomy and Genesis (Matt.: Genesis first, then Deut.; Mark: Deut. first and then Genesis) and also the fact

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that in Matthew it is the Pharisees who ask the question about Deut. 24:1, but in Mark it is Jesus. And we might regard Matt. 19:9 as spoken "in the house", as Mark informs us, since Matthew for some reason many times omits a similar place reference, although from Matthew alone we should not conclude this. Or Matt. 19:9 may have been spoken to the disciples in the further discussion in the house. It is reasonable to think that the discussion would take longer than what is recorded, but that what the gospels narrate is an accurate summary.

Overshadowing in importance all these details is the fact that the emphasis appears to be different in the two records. Matthew relates the discussion to the burning question among the Jews at the time, whether divorce was permissible for every cause, it being recognized by all that unfaithfulness was a sufficient cause. In the answer Jesus says divorce is not permissible for any cause except unfaithfulness. But in Mark the question propounded concerned the permissibility of divorce at all; and the answer is that divorce is not permitted. Each record "hangs together" in itself; but why does Mark make into a general question what Matthew relates to the immediate dispute among them; or conversely, why does Matthew narrow down to a specific problem what Mark presents in its broadest issue?

Some have answered these questions by attaching particular meanings and applications to the words recorded in Matthew, in this way bringing Matthew more nearly into line with Mark. We must now turn to these attempts at harmonizing the two records.

If the doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage is accepted it becomes necessary to explain away the surface meaning of

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the exceptive clauses. Writing of the reference to the exceptive clause in Matthew 5 in a recently re-issued and revised book on Marriage and Divorce the Bishop of Oxford gives the choice of four explanations: (1) That the exceptive clause stood in the original saying but did not refer to divorce at all, but to separation on the grounds of nullity; (2) That the clause is an unintelligent insertion either by Matthew or some early editor; (3) That the clause was inserted again either by Matthew or by his editor, under the impression the the word translated "fornication" meant adultery, and therefore that if a woman was already an adulteress, divorce and re-marriage did not make her one; (4) That the clause was inserted by a scribe of a rigorist group in the early church who required a husband to dismiss his wife if she was unfaithful. (There have been representatives of this rigorist school in the brotherhood in modern times.)

We can dismiss (2), (3) and (4), as we cannot regard the authors of the gospel as so incompetent as these explanations would make them, and also the idea of the clause being an insertion in the absence of evidence is simply groundless speculation, and is therefore unacceptable. We look then at (1) -- that the exceptive clause refers not to divorce but to nullity. The basis for this idea rests on an argument concerning the meanings of words used for "fornication" and "adultery". The usual word for the infidelity of a married woman is moicheia, but in Matthew's exceptive clause it is porneia. The meaning of the latter word has inevitably been hotly discussed. That it may be a synonym for moicheia the Bishop of Oxford acknowledges. Since, however, the two words occur together in Christ's list of fleshly works (Matt. 15:19) they can have different meanings. Three explanations are offered us: that porneia denotes

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(a) "prolonged or promiscuous unchastity after marriage" which it is recognized does not help in Matt. 5:32; (b) "prenuptial unchastity" and (c) "relationship within the prohibited degrees". If either (b) or (c) is the meaning, then the exceptive clause declares null and void a marriage where those conditions exist, and the doctrine of indissolubility of marriage remains unchallenged by any saying of Jesus. In favour of (c) is the fact that quite a number of scholars have given the word this meaning where it occurs in the decrees of the Council at Jerusalem (Acts 15). Ramsay lends the weight of his authority to this interpretation in the passage in Acts. But an examination of the use of the word in other places makes it impossible that in Matthew's reference the word can have such a restricted meaning.

We come then to (b) "prenuptial unchastity". This explanation has found favour with some brethren and calls for fuller examination.

The name of a famous Roman Catholic historian, Dr. Dollinger, is generally associated with this view. As a Roman Catholic he accepted the dogma of his Church that marriage was not dissoluble, and he therefore had to find an explanation for the exceptive clause consistent with that dogma. In his book, The First Age of Christianity and the Church, Dollinger devotes about fourteen pages (366-379) to the subject of marriage. He of course regards marriage as a means of grace, a sacrament ministered through the Church. He is rather a diffuse writer and only a few sentences can be quoted:

"Matthew is known to have written in Aramaic for the Jews of Palestine, and accordingly what is conspicuous in his gospel is the local colouring, the Jewish line of thought,

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the connexion of Christianity and Judaism, while Mark and Luke wrote for Gentile converts. Hence Mark says that Christ declared the woman also, who left her husband and married another, according to heathen custom, an adulteress, while Matthew omits this, as being a thing unheard of among Jews. It is the reverse with the exception about fornication. Christ had said that, only in one case, when a man discovers that his wife has deceived him and was unchaste before marriage, so that he has married one not a maid, he may give her a writing of divorce and put her away. That this is his meaning appears from the word used (porneia), which is always applied to the sin of an unmarried person, not to unfaithfulness in a wife, which is constantly described by another word (moicheia) both in the Old and New Testament . . . In such cases of divorce there was properly no dissolving of the matrimonial bond, for every marriage took place under the condition recognized by the Law, that the bride should be a maid; and deception in a point so essential to Oriental notions invalidated the whole act, for in such a case the man's consent could not be supposed. It was fair that the man should thus divorce a girl he would never have married had he known of her sin, and he showed forbearance in not getting her put to death. And when Christ added for the Jews, who could only thus understand him, this one exception, where divorce was allowable, his rule, that man may not sever what God has joined, remained wholly unaffected ... It is clear, again, how Mark, in a narrative designed for Gentile converts, could omit what Matthew had said of the exceptional case mentioned by Christ, as something only concerning the Jews and not affecting the general question of the indissolubility of marriage."

It would appear utterly incongruous that out of the one discussion with the Pharisees there should emerge one rule for the Jews, recorded by Matthew, and yet a different rule

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for Gentiles, recorded by Mark. Such a view would make all the teaching of Jesus recorded in Matthew inapplicable to Gentiles. The sermon on the Mount, in which the same teaching on the exceptive clause occurs, would also apply only to Jews, although it has been universally regarded as containing the teaching of Jesus for his followers in every age and of every nation. In addition, on the meaning of porneia and moicheia most scholars sharply dissent from Dollinger.

Dr. Charles in Divorce and Nullity translates porneia by "unchastity", and says that the word "is a generic term for sexual vice: it is used of at least six varieties of such vice, of which fornication is one".

Discussing the meanings of the two words Dr. Chase says:

"The first question is, What is the meaning of the Greek word porneia, translated here by the word 'fornication', and what is its relation to the word moicheia (adultery)? It is necessary to discuss this question, because it has been maintained that in some writers porneia means adultery and that among these writers is Matthew. The word porneia then, means (1) strictly, intercourse with a prostitute (porne); (2) in a wider sense, all illicit intercourse. On the other hand, moicheia denotes illicit intercourse on the part of a husband or of a wife, and especially (as would be natural among peoples whose laws and customs had grown up at a time when polygamy was practised) in the case of a wife. An act of moicheia, therefore, may under certain circumstances be an act of porneia in the first and strict sense; it always is an act of porneia in the second and wider sense; as it always is an act of 'uncleanness' and of 'sin'. But, on the other hand, an act of porneia is not necessarily an act of moicheia; it is so only when one of the parties is a married person. The words, therefore, are not interchangeable but are quite distinct in meaning."

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The interpretation of porneia as meaning unchastity is an ancient one. Chase has the following: "The interpretation which makes the exceptive clause refer to a wife's adultery is the interpretation which, to say the least, has been the common interpretation in the Christian Church; and it certainly can be traced to a very early date ... It must be regarded as the almost universal interpretation in ancient and in modern times, and is supported by predominating authority."

To this testimony of Chase might be added the words of Allen: (Commentary on Matthew, I.C.C.) "To the recognition of the fact that Christ's teaching permitted divorce for fornication the early church held firm", and he gives a long list of early writers who "affirm it".

While the interpretation that porneia means unchastity has the support of early Christian writers, on the other hand it must be noticed that Dollinger's interpretation is a modern one. Salmon, in The Human Element in the Gospels says:

"I must reject, as an unsuccessful piece of special pleading, DoIlinger's attempt to reconcile the Roman prohibition with Matthew, on the plea that porneia is not moicheia, and therefore can only refer to defilement contracted before marriage. Besides that this interpretation is hopelessly modern, it is unreasonable to hold that a husband is not at liberty to divorce a wife who has been unfaithful to her marriage vow, but that he may send her away on account of a fault committed before she had made any vow of faithfulness to him, or contracted any obligation towards him. But the fatal weakness of the theory is in its assumption that porneia does not include moicheia, while 1 Cor. 5:1,

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where it is applied to adultery and incest, would alone suffice to prove the contrary; and other proofs can be given that porneia was a general word, including all forms of unchastity, of which moicheia is one." (G. Salmon, The Human Element in the Gospels, page 129)

In addition to the point made by Salmon that it is unreasonable that a man could divorce a woman for a fault before any vow was made to him, but could not divorce his wife who broke her marriage vows to him, it should be noticed that on the interpretation that Christ did allow divorce for pre-marital unchastity (such divorce being really a case of nullity) then that teaching of Jesus practically excluded from marriage any woman who had so sinned. For if such sin made marriage null, it also made impossible any marriage at all, for if it was a ground on which a marriage could be declared null, it would form an impediment to a further marriage. While this seems an inevitable conclusion, it appears to be ignored by all writers.

Accepting the text of Matthew as it stands, and for the moment leaving any attempt to explain the omission of the exceptive clause in Mark, can we see any reasons for the permission of divorce for unfaithfulness?

It is sometimes said that if the exceptive clause is truly a saying of Jesus and not an insertion of the evangelist, then the answer of Jesus is only an endorsement of the contention of the stricter school of Shammai, and that Jesus would not have taken sides in such a dispute. But why should he not do so, if one side was right and the other wrong? While, however, the teaching of Shammai was near to that of Jesus on this question, it was on different grounds. We have

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before shown (chapter 4) that the followers of Shammai were not correct in their interpretation that the permission for divorce in Deut. 24:1 was limited to unchastity. But if their interpretation of Deut. 24:1 was not correct, then it could not be the basis of the exception allowed by Jesus. In that case, the teaching of Jesus was not an endorsement of the Shammaites' interpretation, and his "exceptive clause" must have some other basis. Can we find a reason why he allowed the exception?

Let us recall the fact pointed out in chapter 4, that the Law of Moses required that marital unfaithfulness should be punished with the death of both parties. A betrothed woman who was unfaithful also had to die, for betrothal was as binding as marriage, being the preliminary step to it. Under the law of Moses (which was God's law for Israel) adultery terminated the marriage bond in a drastic way. Since man and woman in marriage become "one flesh" the act of adultery, by forming another union, disrupts the marriage bond. The penalty of death left the innocent party free from the law which bound him or her to the other partner and therefore in a position to contract another marriage.

If the law of God took so stern a view of unchastity on the part of a married person, might not Jesus, when re-stating the highest law of marriage as laid down in Eden and at the same time brushing aside the permissions of the law of Moses for divorce for other reasons than unfaithfulness, have yet recognized the fact that adultery broke the marriage covenant? This seems reasonable, and puts the "exceptive clause" in a consistent relationship to the elevated view of marriage enjoined by Jesus.

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The death penalty could not be imposed by the Jewish authorities at the time Jesus spoke. This fact provides the clue to the action of the authorities in bringing to Jesus the woman taken in adultery. If Jesus had answered their enquiry whether she should be stoned by saying Yes, they would have reported Jesus to the Roman authorities for sedition; if he had said No, they would have represented this attitude to the Jewish people as a failure to uphold the Law of Moses. Jesus on this as on other occasions was not entangled in their snare.

But Jesus knew that his "church", consisting of men and women "taken out" of Gentile nations, would not be constituted as a civil society and would not impose penalties which it is essential a state should inflict on wrongdoers. Yet Jesus nevertheless recognizes that the principle which governs marriage is so far violated by unchastity that it is permissible for that unfaithfulness to be a cause of terminating the marriage.

Having reached this conclusion, it is still desirable that we seek a reason for the different presentation of the discussion in Mark and Matthew. But before we do that, we must examine the teaching of Paul in his letter to the Corinthians.

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